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Abstract
Deep neural networks have been demonstrated to be vulnerable to adversarial
attacks, where small perturbations intentionally added to the original inputs can fool
the classifier. In this paper, we propose a defense method, Featurized Bidirectional
Generative Adversarial Networks (FBGAN), to extract the semantic features of the
input and filter the non-semantic perturbation. FBGAN is pre-trained on the clean
dataset in an unsupervised manner, adversarially learning a bidirectional mapping
between the high-dimensional data space and the low-dimensional semantic space;
also mutual information is applied to disentangle the semantically meaningful
features. After the bidirectional mapping, the adversarial data can be reconstructed
to denoised data, which could be fed into any pre-trained classifier. We empirically
show the quality of reconstruction images and the effectiveness of defense.
1 Introduction
The existence of adversarial examples causes serious security concern about reliability of deep neural
networks (DNN). DNN may mislabel the perturbed images with high confidence even though the
perturbation is too small to be recognized by human. Moreover, adversarial examples will often
fool several models simultaneously, even if these models have different architectures (Szegedy et al.,
2014). One possible explanation is that when recognizing images, human usually catch high-level
and semantic features, such as the shape of the digits in MNIST dataset, which are robust under
small perturbation; DNN may easily catch low-level and weak features, such as the gray-scale values
of certain area in the images, which are non-robust when the pixel-wise perturbation accumulates
(Tsipras et al., 2018).
Most previous adversarial defense methods fall into two classes: adversarial training and gradient
masking. Adversarial training methods (Szegedy et al., 2014; Tramèr et al., 2017; Madry et al.,
2017; Sinha et al., 2017) apply adversarial perturbations on training data online, and feed both the
clean data and the adversarial data to train the classifier, i.e., solve a minimax game iteratively.
However, it is flawed by the high computational cost to generate adversarial examples, especially for
more complex dataset and harder attacks. Gradient masking methods modify the architecture of the
classifier such that the attacker cannot get useful gradient information of the inputs. One example is
the thermometer encoding (Buckman et al., 2018) which preprocesses the input in a one hot vector,
and such discretization prevent the attacker from backpropagating through the input to calculate the
adversarial perturbation. However, Athalye et al. (2018) shows that gradient masking methods can be
circumvented and lead to a false sense of security in defenses against adversarial attacks.
Both of adversarial training and gradient masking methods defend adversarial attacks by improving
the classifier. We take another approach by denoising the adversarial examples without changing the
classifier (Meng and Chen, 2017; Ilyas et al., 2017; Liao et al., 2018). Our defense is motivated by
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(a) Semantic codes
(b) FBGAN structure
Figure 1: (a) The semantic features of images should be unchanged before and after the adversarial
perturbation. Via FBGAN, original, adversarial and reconstructed images are encoded to similar
semantic codes. Each column stands for the ten-categorical code that related to the classification of
an image (see section 3 for details). Here all three images are classified as “7” from categorical codes.
(b) Besides a discriminator D and a generator G in the vanilla GAN, we add an encoder E mapping
from the data space to the latent space, and the discriminator D takes a tuple (x, z) as input. There
are three types of tuple (x, z): (x, E(x)) for x ∼ Px, (G(z), z) for z ∼ Pz and (G(E(x)), E(x))
for x ∼ Px; the discriminator D treats the first type as real and the other two as fake. Mutual
information between latent codes z and generated G(z) is maximized in order to disentangle the
semantic features.
human cognition process. The fact that adversarial examples cannot fool human suggests that human
do classification based on some semantic features that are unchanged after the perturbation. Hence,
it is natural to extract those semantic features and doing the inference solely based on semantic
information. One closely related work is Defense-GAN (Samangouei et al., 2018), which trains
a GAN (Goodfellow et al., 2014a) to generate the manifold of unperturbed images, then finds the
nearest point on the manifold to the adversarial example as the denoising result. While it is a novel
way to leverage generative model to filter the adversarial perturbation, it takes iterations to search the
nearest point on the manifold, which is time consuming.
In this paper, we propose Featurized Bidirectional GAN (FBGAN), an encoding and generative model
that extracts the semantic features of the input images (either original or perturbed), and reconstructs
the unperturbed images from these features. We take advantage of the generative capability of
Bidirectional GAN (Donahue et al., 2016; Dumoulin et al., 2016), where an encoder is learned to
map the input to its latent codes directly, instead of doing the manifold search iterations. Inspired by
InfoGAN (Chen et al., 2016), we maximize the mutual information (MI) between all the latent codes
and the generated images. The MI regularization can significantly reduce the dimension of latent
space, as well as disentangle the semantic features of inputs in different components of the latent
codes, e.g., the tilt angle and stroke thickness of digits in MNIST. We call the MI-enhanced latent
codes as semantic codes (Figure 1). FBGAN is pre-trained on the clean dataset in an unsupervised
manner. With the feature-extraction and reconstruction procedure, we can denoise the adversarial
examples and fed them into any pre-trained classifier, which shows effective defense against both
white-box and gray-box attacks (see section 4 for details).
Our contribution
1. FBGAN depicts a bidirectional mapping between a high-dimensional data space and a
low-dimensional semantic latent space. We can extract the semantic features of the images,
which is unchanged after the adversarial perturbation; we can also generate new images
with indicated semantic features, such as the category and tilt angle of the digit.
2. We denoise the adversarial example by extracting semantic features and reconstructing via
FBGAN. This defense method is shown to be effective for any given pre-trained classifier
under both white-box and gray-box attacks.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Generative Adversarial Networks and its derivatives
Generative Adversarial Networks GAN (Goodfellow et al., 2014a) is a generative model to learn
high-dimensional data distribution via an adversarial process. Instead of modeling the probability
density function, GAN learns a generator G which is a mapping from low-dimensional latent space
Ωz to high-dimensional data space Ωx. Then a standard distribution (usually Gaussian) z ∼ Pz in
the latent space can be transferred into the distribution G(z) ∼ PG in the data space. PG is supposed
to approximate the objective data distribution Px, thus a discriminator D is proposed to distinguish
between samples from Px and PG. The generator G and discriminator D are represented by DNN
and updated in the following minimax game:
min
G
max
D
VGAN(D,G) := Ex∼Px [logD(x)] + Ez∼Pz [log(1−D(G(z)))]. (1)
It can be shown that the theoretical optimal discriminator D? satisfies:
D?(x) =
Px(x)
Px(x) + PG(x)
, VGAN(D
?, G) = 2DJS (Px‖PG)− 2 log 2, (2)
where P (·) denotes the probability density of distribution P , and DJS is the Jensen-Shannnon
divergence between two distribution. Thus the theoretical optimal generator G? will recover the data
distribution, i.e. PG? = Px.
Bidirectional GAN BiGAN (Donahue et al., 2016; Dumoulin et al., 2016) considers the inverse
mapping of the generator to learn the latent codes z as feature representation given data x. The
encoder E is introduced as a mapping from data space Ωx to latent space Ωz , and the discrimina-
tor takes a tuple of data point and latent codes (x, z) as inputs, distinguishing between the joint
distribution of (x, E(x)) and (G(z), z). The minimax objective becomes
min
G,E
max
D
VBiGAN(D,G,E) := Ex∼Px [logD(x, E(x))] + Ez∼Pz [log(1−D(G(z), z))]. (3)
The optimal condition for D? is replacing Px and PG by Px,E(x) and PG(z),z in (2). The optimal
encoder and generator can guarantee G?(E?(x)) = x for x ∈ Ωx and E?(G?(z)) = z for z ∈ Ωz .
InfoGAN InfoGAN (Chen et al., 2016) is an extension of GAN that is able to learn disentangled
semantic representation. For example, one discrete latent code may represent the class of the image
while another continuous code may control tilt angles. InfoGAN decomposes the latent codes into
two parts z = (c, z′) where the semantic codes c target the meaningful features, and noise codes z′
which stand for incompressible noise. Then an information-theoretic regularization is introduced to
maximize MI between semantic codes c and generated G(c, z′):
min
G
max
D
VInfoGAN(D,G) := Ex∼Px [logD(x)]+Ez∼Pz [log(1−D(G(z)))]−λI(c;G(c, z′)), (4)
where the mutual information I(c;x) = H(c)−H(c|x) and H is the entropy.
2.2 Adversarial attacks
In the image classification task, given a vectorized clean image x ∈ [0, 1]d, a classifier C will output
a label y = C(x). All adversarial attacks aim to find a small perturbation ρ to fool the classifier such
that C(x+ ρ) 6= y (Szegedy et al., 2014). It can be formulated as
min
ρ
‖ρ‖, s.t. x+ ρ ∈ [0, 1]d, C(x+ ρ) 6= y.
Various attacking algorithms have been proposed to fool DNN (Akhtar and Mian, 2018; Papernot
et al., 2016), and here are two most famous attacks.
Fast Gradient Sign Method FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2014b) is a single-step attack. Let L(x, y)
be the loss function of the classifier C given input x and label y. FGSM defines the perturbation ρ as
ρ = ε · sign(∇xL(x, y)),
where ε is a small scalar. FGSM simply chooses the sign of change at each pixel to increase the loss
L(x, y) and fool the classifier.
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Projected Gradient Descent PGD (Madry et al., 2017) is a more powerful multi-step attack with
projected gradient descent:
xPGD0 = x, x
PGD
t+1 = ΠS
[
xPGDt + α · sign
(∇xL(xPGDt , y))]
where ΠS is the projection onto S = {x′ : ‖x′ − x‖∞ ≤ ε}.
3 Featurized Bidirectional GAN
3.1 Route map
We use BiGAN framework to adversarially learn the bidirectional feature mapping, and MI regulariza-
tion to reduce the dimension of semantic codes and disentangle the semantic features. In adversarial
defense task, first we train FBGAN on clean dataset, which is an unsupervised learning for semantic
encoder E and image generator G. Second, given a pre-trained classifier C and adversarial data x,
we reconstruct x as x˜ = G(E(x)) to filter the non-semantic noise, then feed x˜ to the classifier and
use C(x˜) as the prediction.
3.2 Formulation
BiGAN provides a good approach to map high-dimensional image data x to low-dimensional latent
codes z = E(x), yet it has no restriction on the semantic meaning of the latent codes z. To eliminate
the non-semantic noise in adversarial examples, we maximize mutual information between latent
codes z and generated G(z). Unlike InfoGAN where the latent codes is decomposed into semantic
codes and incompressible noise z = (c, z′) and only I(c;G(c, z′)) is maximized, here we regard
all latent codes as semantic and maximize I(z, G(z)) directly. Although the former method may
improve the diversity of the generation, our method focuses on the main semantic features which is
more robust under adversarial attack.
To maximize the mutual information I(z;G(z)), we use Variational Information Maximization
technique. Suppose the underlying joint distribution is (x, z) ∼ P , then
I(z;x) = H(z)−H(z|x) = H(z) + EP [logP (z|x)] = H(z) + max
Q
EP [logQ(z|x)],
where Q is taken over all possible joint distributions of (x, z). Assume that each semantic codes
z contain one categorical code zc and n continuous codes z1, . . . , zn. Assume that Q(·|x) is a
factored distribution Q(z|x) = Qc(zc|x)
∏n
i=1Qi(zi|x). For the categorical code, rewrite the
discrete probability Qc(·|x) as a vector ϕc(x), i.e. ϕc(x)k = Qc(zc = k|x), then logQc(zc|x) =−H(zc,ϕc(x)) where H is the cross entropy of two vectors regarding zc as a one-hot vector. For
the continuous codes, assume Qi(·|x) is a Gaussian N (ϕi(x), σ2) for fixed variance σ. Now, define
MI gap as the following distance
dist(z,ϕ(x)) := − logQ(z|x) = H(zc,ϕc(x)) + C
n∑
i=1
‖zi − ϕi(x)‖2 (5)
where ϕ is the concatenation of (ϕc, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) and C is a constant. Note that the MI gap is a
useful approach to maximize MI between two variables.
In the defense task, we want to pay more attention to the encoding E(x) and reconstruction G(E(x))
on given data x, and take the pair (G(E(x)), E(x)) into consideration. Therefore, FBGAN has the
following objective function (as illustrated in Figure 1)
min
G,E,ϕ
max
D
VFBGAN(D,G,E) := Ex
[
logD(x, E(x))
]
+
1
2
[
Ez
[
log(1−D(G(z), z))]+ Ex[ log(1−D(G(E(x)), E(x)))]]+ λEz dist(z,ϕ(G(z))). (6)
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3.3 Implementation
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Figure 2: Implementation The encoder E(x)
is a convolutional network and the generator G(z)
is a deconvolutional network. The discriminator
D(x, z) shares parameters with the auxiliary func-
tion ϕ(x). z = (zc, z1:n) stands for the categorical
and continuous codes.
Figure 2 shows the implementation of FBGAN.
E, G and D take the standard BiGAN archi-
tectures (Dumoulin et al., 2016). We replace
all ReLU activation with ELU in E and G for
smoothness, and use weight normalization in-
stead of batch normalization in order to ensure
E(x) and G(z) depend only on x and z instead
of the whole minibatch (Kumar et al., 2017). E
are trained by feature matching methods, while
G and D are trained by the original GAN loss
objectives (Salimans et al., 2016). The hyperpa-
rameter λ = 1. In relatively complicated dataset
such as SVHN, we add an auto-encoder term
Ex∼Px‖G(E(x)) − x‖2 in the objective func-
tion for only the last 1% training steps to further
improve the reconstruction quality.
4 Experiments
We present our results in two parts: (1) Representing capability of semantic codes. We can store the
information of an image by a few number of semantic codes, and the reconstruction from the codes
keep the main features as the original one. (2) Defenses against gray-box and white-box attacks. In
this paper, we call gray-box attacks as having access only to the original classifier architectures and
parameters; white-box attacks are those have access to both of the classifier and FBGAN details.
We focus on three datasets in our experiments: the MNIST hand-written digits dataset (LeCun et al.,
1998), Fashion MNIST (FMNIST) dataset (Xiao et al., 2017), and the Street View House Numbers
(SVHN) dataset (Netzer et al., 2011).
4.1 Semantic representation
FBGAN can present the semantic features of MNIST by one ten-dimensional categorical code
and only four continuous codes, and FMNIST by one ten-dimensional categorical code and eight
continuous codes. Previous related works require much higher latent space dimension. For example
in InfoGAN, one ten-dimensional categorical code and three continuous codes and 128 random noises
codes are used.
Categorical code can learn the most significant modes in a data distribution. For example, the
ten-categorical code in MNIST / FMNIST represents ten different digits / fashion products. The
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 3: Manipulating semantic codes on MNIST and FMNIST Images generated by one
ten-dimensional categorical code and eight continuous codes. (a) and (c) demonstrate that we can
generate any category of images by changing the categorical codes. (b) and (d) are the effects of
continuous codes: each row shows how the generated image changes when tuning one continuous
codes with all other codes fixed.
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Table 1: Classification accuracy (%) under different attack and defense methods for MNIST and
FMNIST. The perturbation ε is in l∞ norm. FBGAN here uses one ten-dimensional categorical code
and 8 continuous codes. Gray-box attacks only apply to noise-filtering-type defense, and we compare
FBGAN and Defense-GAN under the same setting. For white-box attack, the adversarial training
with PGD ε = 0.3 is one of the state of the art results. Although better than FBGAN, adversarial
training has its limitation: if the attack method is harder than the one used in training (PGD is harder
than FGSM), or the perturbation is larger, then the defense may totally fail. FBGAN is effective and
consistent for any given classifier, regardless of the attack method or perturbation.
Gray-box White-box
Attack ε Nodefense FBGAN
Defense
GAN FBGAN
Adv train
FGSM 0.3
Adv train
PGD 0.1
Adv train
PGD 0.3
MNIST
Clean 0 99.3 97.6 93.6 97.6 99.2 99.5 98.8
FGSM 0.1 78.2 96.6 95.2 93.4 97.4 97.9 97.6
FGSM 0.3 18.9 87.0 82.0 82.8 94.4 83.1 96.0
PGD 0.1 10.5 96.3 94.7 91.7 83.0 96.1 97.3
PGD 0.3 0.6 90.9 93.2 88.6 3.9 29.2 94.0
FMNIST
Clean 0 91.2 82.2 78.0 82.2 91.4 89.9 91.0
FGSM 0.1 24.2 76.3 52.6 62.7 82.6 81.0 75.9
FGSM 0.3 9.1 41.0 38.9 49.2 89.4 42.4 74.4
PGD 0.1 5.9 76.9 62.6 50.5 12.1 71.7 61.8
PGD 0.3 5.7 58.8 62.6 44.2 5.6 7.1 68.1
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Reconstruction of MNIST and FMNIST The first two rows are the original test
set images and their reconstructions; the middle two rows are the gray-box adversaries and their
reconstructions; the last two rows are the white-box adversaries and their reconstructions. All the
adversaries are from PDG with purtabation ε = 0.3.
continuous codes can finely tune the more detailed features of a certain mode. Figure 3 shows ten
MNIST digits generated by FBGAN and the effect of tuning different continues codes.
We observe that the reconstruction of MNIST and FMNIST datasets are of high qualities. The encoder
first encodes a semantic representation, which is then fed into the generator. The reconstructed image
not only maintains the category, but also detailed features as the input.
4.2 Adversarial defenses
4.2.1 Defenses against gray-box attacks
In gray-box attacks, the attacker can only access to the classifier, but have no information about the
FBGAN filter. Hence we prepare our adversarial data by using FGSM and PGD methods to directly
attack trained classifiers. The classifier tested on the original MNIST dataset has accuracy of 99.26%,
and the classifier tested on the original FMNIST dataset has accuracy of 91.16%. Table 1 shows
our defense effect against different methods with different ε values. As shown in Figure 4, given
adversarial examples generated by PGD method with ε = 0.3, we have the reconstructed images with
categories and main features maintained, and there are no more attack noises there.
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(a)
Attack ε Nodefense FBGAN
Clean 0 93.7 83.4
FGSM 0.05 11.4 66.4
FGSM 0.10 10.8 47.7
PGD 0.05 3.4 71.5
PGD 0.10 2.9 60.9
(b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5: Generation and reconstruction of SVHN (a) and (c) are generated images by changing
the categorical codes and continuous codes respectively, similar to Figure 3. We observe that the
continuous codes shown in (c) control: the blurriness (from clear to blurry), brightness (from bright
to dark), background color (from green to brown) and the feature on the edge. (b) and (d) are the
adversarial defense results. (b) shows the accuracy on clean, adversarial and reconstructed images,
similar to Table 1. In (d), the first two rows are the clean images and their reconstructions, and the
last two rows are the gray-box adversaries (PGD, ε = 0.1) and their reconstructions. The semantic
codes consist 4 ten-categorical codes and 128 continuous codes.
4.2.2 Defenses against white-box attacks
In white-box case, the attacker can access not only the classifier but also the FBGAN filter. The origi-
nal data x is fed through the encoder E, the generator G and the classifier C to output C(G(E(x)))
as the classification. Since E, G and C are all represented as DNN, the whole structure is a large
DNN and regraded as the objective of white-box attacks.
We implement white-box defense on MNIST and FMNIST with FBGAN having one ten-categorical
code and eight continuous codes. A regularization is added to the encoded semantic codes z = E(x):
for the categorical code which is represented by a 10-dimensional probability vector, we replace
it by the corresponding one-hot vector; for the continuous codes, we clip them between [−1, 1].
Regularizing the categorical codes can map the original input to its counterpart in the generated space,
and clipping the continuous codes is to eliminate the influence of those low probability outliers. The
results are shown in Figure 4 and Table 1, where the accuracy is above 82% on MNIST and 44% on
FMNIST with adversarial perturbation ε = 0.3.
4.3 Comparison with BiGAN and InfoGAN
BiGAN and InfoGAN are generative models aiming to produce new detailed data, while FBGAN is a
defense model aiming to regenerate data with semantic features. The main novelty of FBGAN lies
in combining the bidirectional mapping structure and feature extraction capability for the purpose
of adversarial defense. The most important improvement from BiGAN and InfoGAN to FBGAN is
the significant reduction of the number of semantic codes by applying MI regularization on all the
semantic codes. BiGAN and InfoGAN require larger latent space to ensure the quality and diversity
of the generation, and the semantic features are stored in latent codes in a highly entangled way;
FBGAN requires much smaller latent space to catch the basic semantic features which is robust
under attacks. For example, BiGAN and InfoGAN both employ at least 128 codes to represent
and regenerate data of MNIST, while FBGAN reduces the number to 10 categorical codes and 4
continuous codes. Hence, generative models, such as BiGAN and InfoGAN, and FBGAN are tools
for tasks in different domains.
7
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6: Performance of vanilla BiGAN (a) illustrates MI gap (5) of the categorical code, where
FBGAN converges fast but BiGAN does not. (b) and (c) are generated images by changing the
categorical code and continuous codes, similar to Figure 3. The semantic features are entangled in
the latent codes of BiGAN.
Vanilla BiGAN without MI regularization cannot disentangle the semantic features. Theoretically,
if BiGAN achieved its optimal solution, the minimization of JS divergence DJS(Px,E(x)‖PG(z),z)
would ensure that H(z|G(z)) = 0 and all latent codes are effective. However, experiments show that
BiGAN cannot minimize the conditional cross entropy, and the latent codes cannot disentangle the
semantic features automatically (Figure 6). Thus it is necessary to apply explicit MI regularization.
5 Discussion
Nonetheless, the effectiveness of our FBGAN model against adversarial attacks are highly dependent
on the reconstruction accuracy. It is also challenging to get a high reconstruction accuracy without
over-fitting the training data. For example, in SVHN, we apply 4 ten-dimensional categorical codes
and 128 continuous codes; however, its white-box defense accuracy is much worse than that of
MNIST and FMNIST. We consider the various performances with different datasets as the fact that
SVHN dataset has much more modes than the rest two datasets have. Even though the features within
one category are quite different, for example different images of number one, the background of
an image adds a large number of extra features to the object, which makes mode separation much
harder. In contrast, MNIST and FMNIST dataset with all black background could be separated via
fewer categorical codes. In our opinion, if we can find the suitable number of categorical codes, the
performance of our model will be improved.
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